This paper estimates de impact of a program launched in 2011 to improve learning outcomes of the worst performing schools in Chile. Since the program started with half of all eligible schools, a randomization was made to select participant schools in the first year. Outcomes were measured with two main instruments: the national standardized test in Chile (SIMCE) and CLASS, an instrument well documented in the education literature that measures the teachers' quality through the coding of different aspects of teachers' behavior following a rigorous protocol and using videotaped classes. Results show that students' test scores improve mildly. Improvement was only observed in higher income students and disappears shortly. No impact can be detected in CLASS scores for the teachers, what helps understand the weak effect on students learning.
I. INTRODUCTION

Teacher behavior and students performance
This paper estimates the impact of improved teaching techniques on students' learning outcomes in low performing schools. Recent empirical evidence has consistently showed that teachers matter: estimates of teacher value added (that is, estimates of teachers fixed effects) are found to correlate positively and significantly with students' test scores.
However, typical observable characteristics of teachers (such as education, tenure or experience) do not explain variability in teacher value added. Recent studies suggest that the quality of the teacher interactions with students is what results in differences in students' learning. Thus, what the teacher does in the classroom and their ability to interact positively with their student is makes a good teacher. Still, what kind of interventions could improve teacher-student interactions remains unknown. In this paper we confirm the importance of good teacher-students interaction for students' learning and contribute to answering the question about effective mechanisms to improve the quality of teaching by evaluating a program that relies on teaching material and technical assistance to teachers to improve students' test scores.
We profit from the experimental design of a large scale educational program in Chile. The program Plan Apoyo Compartido (henceforth, PAC) was implemented by the Chilean Ministry of Education in 2011. The main intervention of the program is to provide technical and pedagogical support to teachers in order to help them improve the ways in which they teach the academic curricula and contents. Because of budgetary reasons, among schools eligible for receiving the program only a randomly selected subset of schools was invited to participate. We, hence, benefit from this randomization to measure the impact of the program on students' learning outcomes. Our measure of students' learning is their performance in the Chilean standardized Education Quality Measurement System evaluations (henceforth SIMCE evaluations, for its name in Spanish). The SIMCE is a set of standardized tests on Math, Language, and Science applied to elementary and high school students in the second, fourth, eighth, and tenth grades in all schools in the country. In this paper, we focus the analysis on the universe of students who were in their fourth grade of elementary school in years 2011 and 2012 and attended eligible schools.
Our main results suggest that only the most advantaged kids (kids from high income families) are able to appropriate the positive effects of the program. For the 2011 cohort, high income boys attending schools participating in the program improve SIMCE scores by almost 20% of a test score standard deviation with respect to comparable boys in control schools. For the 2012 cohort, high income girls in treated schools improve their SIMCE scores by more than 20% of a test score standard deviation relative to girls in control schools. These results are strongly robust to adjustments in our inference strategy to control for the bias created by data snooping when we divide the sample of students by demographic characteristics.
To better understand these limited results, we study the effects of the program on within classroom interactions between teachers and students and whether better interactions are associated with better learning outcomes. We source on the Education literature and measure the quality of teacher-students interactions by one of the well-known instruments used, namely, the CLASS (Classroom Assessment Scoring System) (Pianta et al., 2008) . As part of the experimental design for this study, a random sub sample of treatment and control schools from the PAC program where invited to participate in the CLASS experiment. The experiment consisted on filming segments of classes and afterwards assigning videotaped teachers with a score for their interaction with students (we provide details about the CLASS experiment in section 5). There are several studies that link better students outcomes (both in learning and in
Related literature
This paper is embedded in the literature on the production function of education: the relationship between school inputs (that is, the quality and quantity of educational resources) and outputs (that is, students' learning). In particular, our paper contributes to the recent and growing strand that studies whether teachers matter for students outcomes and which characteristics of teachers matter the most.
Early papers consistently found small or perverse effects of certain schools variables on learning. For example, early empirical studies focused on the effect of class size and peer effects on students' performance. Lazear (2001) reviews part of the most important contributions in this area and highlights the fact that results conflict with what is a priory expected: the literature finds either small, insignificant, or perverse (positive) effects of class size on learning.
In order to make sense of this class size puzzle, Lazear (2001) proposes a model where classroom education is a public good with congestion, where a bad behaving students disrupts the learning of the whole class, and schools endogenously choose class size in order to minimize disruption and maximize learning. The small or even perverse effects of class size found in the literature is interpreted, in the light of his model, as a selection effect: schools optimal policy is to assign bad behaving students to small classes (that have a high teacher-student ratio which allows teachers to control disruption) while assigning well behaved students to big classes. In a cross sectional empirical analysis, then, class size will appear to correlate positively with learning, or not correlate at all. Even in experimental studies, that control for the endogenous class size choice, conflicting results are explained by the omission of the probability of classroom disruption.
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As another example, a subsequent set of papers analyze the impact of school resources on students' performance and, similarly, show little and not conclusive effects of school resources on learning. For example, Banerjee et al. (2007) review some of the most notable contributions that conclude that improving resources such as textbooks or flip charts, or even increasing school attendance, have little or no impact in students' performance. Similar to the argument put forward by Lazear to explain the class size puzzle, Banerjee et al. (2007) offer an explanation for the school resources puzzle based on the behavior of individuals. They argue that schools or teachers often lack the incentive to adjust the curricula or adequacy of resources to the particular needs of students, fact that makes improved school resources unlikely to have an effect. For example, if the contents of classes are too hard for most students, or if textbooks are written in a language that most students cannot read, going to school or receiving textbooks will not show significant improvements in learning for the majority of disadvantaged students. In the light of this argument, Banerjee et al. (2007) show the results of two experimental interventions concluding that offering targeted tutoring to the bottom students and targeting the instruction level to all students according to their ability significantly improved students' performance.
However, targeting resources according to ability is not certain to be effective in every context. For example, in a related contribution, Duflo et al. (2011) make the point that under positive peer effects (where students benefit from high achieving classmates) tracking students by baseline achievement (that is, splitting classes and re-grouping students assortatively according to their ability) can actually harm low performing students, unless teachers have the incentives to adapt their behavior (level of instruction) according to the ability distribution of students in their classroom. Although they do not directly observe changes in teaching behavior, they show that tracking significantly improved performance even for low achieving students that are now prevented from interaction with high achieving peers. This, they argue, is only consistent with a model in which teachers change their instructional level in response to the change in the distribution of students in their classrooms. This gives rise to the question of whether teachers matter and motivates the main focus of our paper: whether the interaction between teachers' characteristics and students' ability matters and how that interaction can be effectively improved.
In effect, within the literature on the production function of education, our paper is most closely related to the research program that studies the impact of teachers on students' learning. Important previous related contributions have found that, after controlling for endogenous sorting, teachers matter. For example, in two related contributions, Rivkin et al. (2005) and Chetty et al. (2014) develop econometric techniques that control non experimentally for families' and schools' strategic sorting of students into classrooms and identify the importance of teachers by exploiting events of teacher turnover in the US. Both contributions conclude that increments in teacher quality rises schools' average test scores significantly. 4 In this paper, we start by acknowledging the fact that teachers matter and go one step forward to explore what explains variability in teachers' value added. In particular, we address the question of whether improved teaching techniques and better teacher-students interactions affect positively students' test scores, by analyzing the impact of the PAC intervention and of CLASS teacher scores on students' SIMCE scores. In answering this question, we make at least two additional contributions. First, we explicitly take into account the interaction between teaching methods and students ability types in producing learning outcomes. We, hence, estimate the effect of the PAC program that improves teaching techniques at the student level and identify the types of students that benefit the most from improved teaching practices. Second, we exploit a purely experimental design that can be thought of as assigning 4 Rivkin et al. (2005) develop an econometric model for the average gain in test scores within a grade as function of student, teacher, and school fixed effects that account for strategic behavior. Starting from this specification, the authors are able to derive an expression for the variance of teacher quality that is identified up to a covariance parameter from teacher turnover rates across cohorts and grades within a cohort. Using data from the universe of public schools in Texas, they estimate, then, lower bounds for the importance of teacher quality variability in explaining gains in test scores, concluding that one standard deviation increase in average teacher quality significantly increases average test scores in Math and Reading by at least 0.11 and 0.095 standard deviations of test scores, respectively. Chetty et al. (2014) , on the other hand, use a combination of school district administrative data and tax records from the US to show that a teacher's value added in a given school (that is, the predicted fixed effect of teachers on test scores of a given classroom based on test scores residuals of that classroom in previous years) is an unbiased measure of the impact of teachers on student performance, hence arguing that once baseline test scores are taken into account, studies that rely on value added as measures of teachers importance are not subject to other significant sources of bias. They arrive at this conclusion by showing the remarkably high correlation between value added estimates changes and changes in test scores in the events of teacher turn over. improved ways of teaching the academic material randomly across schools, and allows us to control for parents' and schools' strategic sorting of students into classrooms. We believe our approach contributes to clarifying why previous similar interventions showed little effects. For example, two decades before the implementation of the PAC, the Chilean government launched the P-900 schools program that had similar characteristics as the PAC and that showed little or insignificant effects on students' test scores. Chay et al. (2005) evaluate Chile's P-900 program using a regression discontinuity design that exploits pre-program scores cutoff for eligibility and conclude that each year of exposure to the program had an insignificant or a small positive effect on test scores. We find similar effects on the entire pool of students, but once we take into account the relationship between teachers and students, we find big and significant effects on the sub-population of higher-income kids. The small or insignificant effects for the pool of students can be explained by the fact that high and low type students present conflicting effects of improved teaching techniques: possibly because of the complementarity between teaching methods and students' ability, while high type students are able to appropriate the returns to the different teaching methods, low type students are not.
Complementing this explanation, we show that low income students benefit the most from improved teacher-students interactions, a feature that the program was unable to impact.
Outline
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the program intervention, the experimental design, the data used in this paper, and discusses several randomization checks exercises. In this section we show that attrition rates (that is, the proportion of students that did not sit for the SIMCE subject tests) are balanced across treatment status and that baseline characteristics are not significantly associated with treatment status even for the post attrition sample. Section 3 describes the identification and inference strategies. Section 4 presents the main results of the paper: high income boys and girls in treated schools increase their SIMCE scores by more than 20% of a standard deviation of SIMCE scores in control schools. The effects are smaller and not significant for low income students. In order to understand these results, section 5 studies the importance of within classroom interactions to improve performance and the impact of PAC on these interactions. We find that low income students benefit greatly from improved teacher-students interactions, but that the PAC did not significantly improve the quality of teacher-students interactions. This, possibly together with the complementarity between students' ability and teaching practices might explain why the PAC had a positive effect on high income kids but failed to benefit disadvantaged kids. Finally, section 6 concludes.
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, DATA, AND RANDOMIZATION CHECK
About Plan Apoyo Compartido (PAC)
Plan Apoyo Compartido (henceforth, PAC) was implemented by the Ministry of Education of Chile in 2011 as a targeted educational policy providing technical and pedagogical support to schools historically performing below average in the national standardized test, the SIMCE. The ultimate objective of the program was to improve learning outcomes in Math and Language for students from pre-K to fourth grade and, additionally, in Science for students in third and fourth grades by means of improving class management and pedagogical practices. To achieve this goal, the PAC financed three types of interventions.
The first intervention consisted in the development of unified pedagogical material distributed to teachers and designed to help schools to organize, plan, and optimize the effective implementation of the national school curriculum.
These planning tools included an annual curricular programming, a series of teaching materials designed for six-week periods, and a set of daily planning activities to be used by teachers in the classroom.
The second intervention consisted in the development of four types of tests to monitor progress in students learning: a diagnostic test to determine the initial level of academic skills and knowledge administered at the beginning of the school year, intermediate and final tests to determine students' progress, and students' performance reports. Each of these testing instruments was applied in different moments of the semester to help analyze students' performance in Math and Language (MINEDUC, 2013) . It is worth noting that unlike the SIMCE tests, these instruments were not standardized tests and could be applied voluntarily by PAC schools.
Finally, the third intervention consisted on the creation of two support teams (one internal and one external to schools) expected to work together. The first team, the Education Leadership Team (henceforth ELE, from its name in Spanish), was formed by at least four members: the school principal, the head of the technical and pedagogic office of the school, and two distinguished teachers. This team helped to implement the first and second interventions of the program in the school. The second group, the Team of Technical and Pedagogic Advisors (henceforth ATP, from its name in Spanish), was formed by three authorities of the regional Department of Education (the DEPROV), and aimed to provide external support to the ELE teams. Each ATP visited its assigned schools every 6 to 7 weeks to advise the ELE on the use of the teaching material, on the development of a diagnosis of the school's strengths and weaknesses, and on the analysis of the students' tests scores to study progress (MINEDUC, 2013).
The PAC targeted low performing public and subsidized private schools nationwide. 5 We describe the eligibility criteria and the random assignment of the program below.
Eligibility and Randomization
Among public and subsidized private school in Chile, the Ministry applied two main eligibility criteria to define the target group of schools: first, the school's baseline average SIMCE score for the years between 2005 and 2009 in Math and
Language should be below the national average; and second, there should be at least 20 students per level on average from pre-K to fourth grade. 6 The 2,286 schools that met these criteria were ranked by their 2005-2009 average SIMCE scores in Language and Math and the bottom 1,000 schools were automatically considered eligible. Since participation in the program was voluntary, refusal to participate was expected, so in order to reach a target of around 1,000 eligible schools in the first year of the program, the Ministry increased the sample within each DEPROV by 50%, going up in the the SIMCE ranking. 7 The final sample of eligible schools (1480 schools) were offered participation in the program according to two methodologies. First, a non experimental method was applied to 632 schools located in "small" DEPROVs (DEPROVs with 40 schools or less). These schools were automatically invited to participate in the program and we exclude them from our analysis. Second, an experimental method was applied to the other 848 schools located in "large" DEPROVs. These schools were randomly assigned to being offered participation or not. All in all, the experimental sample that we consider in this paper includes 651 schools that were invited to participate (treatment schools) and 197 schools that were not (control schools).
Data
This paper counts on administrative data provided by the Ministry of Education. This data set contains student level information on treatment status, test scores, and baseline demographic characteristics. Table 6 in appendix A shows summary statistics of all the variables used in this paper, namely, test scores and baseline characteristics, for the group of students that took each of the subject tests (post attrition samples). We describe the variables included in the table next.
The names of columns indicate the set of students over which summary statistics are calculated.
Columns labeled Reading, Math, and Science test takers indicate the pool of students that took each of the corresponding subject tests. This corresponds to the post attrition sample, since for each test, there is a small set of students that did not take the test (we discuss the issue of attrition in the next subsection).
Sub-columns labeled PAC=0 and PAC=1 refer to treatment status. PAC is a dummy variable that takes value one if the student goes to a school that was invited to participate in the program through the randomization, and zero
otherwise. In what follows, we refer to the set of students such that PAC=0 as the control group and to the set of students such that PAC=1 as the treatment group.
In turn, the table is divided in two panels, 2011 and 2012, indicating the fourth grade cohorts considered in this paper.
The names of rows indicate the variable for which we show summary statistics.
SIMCE scores (Reading, Math, and Science) refer to the grade obtained by students in the SIMCE subject tests.
Baseline characteristics indicate characteristics of the students that do not change because of treatment. They include student demographic characteristics and education of parents. Student demographics are Female (a dummy variable that takes value one if the student is a female and zero otherwise), Low income (a dummy variable that takes value one if the student's family monthly income is less than 300,000 Chilean pesos, the minimum wage in such country), Nuclear, Extended, and Other family (three dummies that indicate the family structure of the student), and Nbr years failed (a count variable that captures the number of primary school years the student had to retake previous to the fourth grade). Mother's and father's education refer to the highest education level reached by the student's mother and father. These include No education, Incomplete primary, Primary, Incomplete high school, High school, Incomplete college, and college.
7 At this point some schools were excluded after consultation with DEPROV authorities either because of bad management or because they were already receiving technical and pedagogical assistance from well-known agencies of pedagogical support in Chile. In general, attrition rates in our sample are very low and baseline characteristics are balanced in both, the pre attrition and the post attrition samples.
Treatment-control balance and attrition
In 2011 there is no student that missed the three subject tests in the sample. When analyzing attrition rates by subject for this cohort (not reported in the between the treatment and control groups. These differences are very small: relative to the control group, there is 0.7% less students missing the Reading test and 0.1% more students missing the Math and Science tests in the treatment group. However, all p-values indicate that these differences are not significant.
The next set of rows show the results of a test of differences in means of baseline characteristics. Interestingly, most baseline characteristics are balanced even among the students that did not attrit from the analysis. The exceptions are low income and mother and father incomplete high school: test takers in the treatment group are less likely to be from a low income family and less likely to have a parent with incomplete high school. Even when the p-value indicate that these differences are significant, the magnitude of the economic effect is extremely small, of around 2%.
Moreover, the last row of the 2011 panel shows that taken together, baseline characteristics do not significantly predict whether a student is in the treatment or the control group, even in the post attrition samples. The statistic reported is the F-statistic of the joint test, and p-values indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that baseline characteristics do not jointly determine the random allocation to the program.
The 2012 cohort panel shows a similar analysis. Firstly, attrition rates are higher than in the 2011 cohort, but still low.
In this cohort 15% of students missed the Reading test, 15.26% missed the Math test, and 15.36% missed the Science test (statistics not reported in the table). However, differences in attrition rates between treatment and control groups for 2012 are small and insignificant. Being in the treatment group is associated with about 1% lower probability of sitting for the Reading, Math, and Science tests relative to the control group, but these differences are not statistically different from zero.
Furthermore, with the exception of father's incomplete primary, all baseline characteristics are balanced between treatment and control groups, and they are jointly not significant to explain treatment status, as evidenced by the
All in all, we find the evidence sufficient to be convinced that attrition is not likely to generate bias in the main results of this paper. In both cohorts the difference in the proportion of attritors is negligible in magnitude and not significant and the randomization was successful in balancing baseline characteristics, even for the post attrition samples.
III. ESTIMATION AND INFERENCE
Our main results explore heterogeneous treatment effects by demographic characteristics. We define four demo-graphic groups based on the interaction between the gender of the student and her household income (Female-Low income, Female-Medium-High income, Male-Low income, and Male-Medium-High income).
The main objective of this paper is, therefore, to quantify the causal effect of the education program Plan Apoyo
Compartido on students' performance in standardized tests, conditional on gender and family income. Formally, we aim at estimating the following econometric models for each demographic group g:
where SIMCE kigj is the SIMCE score in subject k = {Math, Language, Science}, of student i, in demographic group g, in school j; PAC j is an indicator variable for participation of school j in the program; X igj is a vector of student-school characteristics that includes baseline characteristics; and ϵ igj is a vector of unobservable student-school characteristics assumed to be uncorrelated with variable PAC.
Our main estimation strategy aims at identifying γ in equation (2), that is, the effect of PAC on SIMCE scores. When PAC is specified as the random assignment to the program, the Ordinary Least Squares estimator of γ in equation (2) consistently estimates the Intention to Treat (ITT) parameter that captures the effect of being randomized into PAC on SIMCE scores.
In both, cohorts 2011 and 2012, there are some non compliant schools which participation into the program contradicts the random assignment. Given the experimental design, we are also able to identify the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) parameter, that is, the effect of actually participating in the PAC on SIMCE scores for the sub-sample of students that attend schools that comply with the random assignment. When PAC in equation (2) is specified as an indicator for actual participation in the program, the Instrumental Variables estimate of γ consistently estimates the LATE parameter by instrumenting treatment actually received with treatment randomly assigned.
In sum, we will estimate the ITT and LATE parameters in model (2) for the three subject tests and the four demographic groups separately. This means that, for each cohort, we will be testing 12 hypotheses of the effect of PAC on test scores. To perform inference, hence, we take into account the fact that we are testing multiple related hypothesishypotheses.
Our inference strategy is twofold. Firstly, we construct 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the reported estimated coefficients. Secondly, we construct adjusted p-values to minimize the error of over rejecting a true hypothesis due to testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously following the Romano & Wolf (2005) step-down procedure. Our objective is to minimize the familywise error rate (FWE) (Romano & Wolf, 2005) , that is, the probability of incorrectly rejecting at least one hypothesis when testing n hypotheses at level α. 8 With this inference method, we are able to report p-values for the tests of the joint hypothesis that control for the FWE. These two inference exercises are based on robust standard errors clustered at the school level (the level at which the random assignment was done). Tables 2 and 3 show the main results of this paper: the estimation of equation 2 for every demographic group and SIMCE subject tests, for the model without covariates. Tables 7 to 8 (4) to (6) display these results for medium-high income females. Columns (9) to (11) are concerned with low income males. Finally, columns (12) to (14) show the corresponding results for the sub-sample of medium-high income males.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
The second set of regressions consists of the effect of being randomized into the program on actually participating in the program. This would be the first stage of the Instrumental Variables strategy that allows us to recover the LATE parameter. This effect is interpreted as the difference in compliance rates between treatment and control groups.
Column (7) shows differences in compliance rates for low income females, column (8) for medium-high income females, column (16) for low income males, and column (17) for medium-high income males.
Based on a χ 2 test for the joint significance of all the effects reported, the program has an overall significant effect (both, when measured by the ITT and the LATE parameters, and for the specifications with and without covariates) with p-values of zero in all joint tests. 9 This suggests that the program did have an effect on SIMCE scores. We next explore the magnitudes of these effects for different cohorts and demographic groups. columns (7), (8), (15), and (16). The effect of participating on the program for compliers is also highly significant for high income boys in Reading and Math, and the magnitudes are bigger than the ITT effect: participating in the program causes an increase in Reading and Math tests scores of more than 26% of the control group standard deviation for students that attend schools that comply with the random assignment. Finally, results from the estimation of the model with covariates are shown in table 7 in the appendix and are very similar, although the effects are about three percent points smaller.
The 2011 cohort
The 2012 cohort
For the 2012 cohort we are only able to find a significant effect for medium-high income girls in Reading scores, while the effects for high income boys disappear. Table 3 shows the results. Being randomized into the program causes an increase in the Reading scores of high income girls of about 21% of the control group standard deviation. The effect is significant at a one percent level even after controlling for the FWE. The estimation of the LATE parameter suggests that the program effect on Reading scores of high income girls in compliant schools is bigger, 34% of the control group standard deviations with a p-value of less than two percent. When estimating the program effect in the specification that includes covariates (shown in table 8 in the appendix), the treatment effects remain significant at the 5% level when testing all hypothesis independently, but are not longer significant after controlling for the FWE.
All in all, the main results of this paper suggest that the PAC had a big and significant effect on the performance of four grader high income boys and girls, although the effects weaken during the second year of the program. In the next section we explore a possible mechanism to explain the pattern of effects found.
V. THE CLASS EXPERIMENT AND STUDENTS' LEARNING
In this section we propose an explanation for why the PAC program shows no impact on the performance of low income students. The small and growing literature that studies what characteristics of teachers matter the most for students' learning has recently started to focus on the quality of within classroom teacher-students interactions. The aim of this section is, therefore, to study how important are within classroom interactions for improving students' learning in our context, and whether the PAC had any positive impact on the quality of teacher-students interactions.
As a preview of our results, we find that higher quality of teacher-students interactions significantly improves the test scores of low income students but have no or little effects on the test scores of high income students. Moreover, we find that the PAC was not successful in improving teacher-students interactions. We believe that these two findings combined provide a plausible explanation for why the PAC did not significantly improve the test scores of disadvantaged kids. If low skill kids benefit relatively more from personalized teaching methods, while high skill kids benefit more from standardized teaching practices, it is expected that the PAC, that focused on improving the standardized part of teaching practices, had its greatest impact on high skilled kids.
Background
The main instrument used in this paper to measure teacher-students interactions is the Classroom Assessment Scoring System (henceforth, CLASS) in its Upper Elementary version (fourth to sixth grade) (Pianta et al., 2008) . The CLASS is one of the well-known instruments used in the Education literature to measure the quality of within classroom interactions. To produce the CLASS measures, trained coders watch and analyze videotaped classes and assign a score for teacher-students interactions in 11 dimensions. These dimensions are part of three main domains:
Emotional Support, Classroom Organization, and Instructional Support. 10 Coders look for specific teachers' behaviors in each dimension, which are well described in the CLASS protocol that guides coders for their scoring.
There are several studies that link better students outcomes (both in learning and in the development of socioemotional skills) with teachers scores in CLASS. Araujo et al. (2014) present a brief review of this literature for the US and perform a study for Kindergarten children in Ecuador. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study in the literature evaluates the effectiveness of a program to improve teaching quality using CLASS.
We next describe how the experimental design for this paper allows us to assess the relationship between CLASS and students' test scores, and the relationship between PAC and teachers' CLASS scores.
The CLASS experiment
In 2012, among the entire PAC experimental sample, a subsample of 210 schools (105 from the PAC treatment group and 105 from the PAC control group) was randomly selected to also participate in the CLASS experiment. Selected schools were asked if they would agree to have some classroom lectures videotaped and analyzed afterwards. The CLASS experiment had some non compliance: in the end, 137 invited schools agreed to participate in the filming sessions.
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For this evaluation, all teachers in the fourth grades of the schools that agreed to participate in the CLASS experiment was videotaped for four full lectures (mostly Language classes). A total of 185 classes (or teachers) were filmed strictly following the CLASS protocol. 12 The coding was done by 10 coders and a supervisor carefully trained and selected. 13 Each of the four hours filmed per teacher was divided into 15-minute segments and one segment per hour was coded (for a total of 760 segments) in each of the CLASS dimensions. Following the CLASS protocol, the score on each dimension was based on a 1 to 7 scale ("low" for scores 1-2, "medium" for scores 3-5, and "high" for scores 6-7). 11 Among these 137 schools, 70 were control PAC schools and 67 were treatment PAC schools. Among the 67 PAC schools, in turn, 58 schools were participating in the PAC, while 9 schools were invited to participate in PAC but did not accept. 12 The fieldwork and coding according to CLASS was coordinated and implemented by a team of the Centro de Politicas Comparadas de Educacion from the Universidad Diego Portales, which had already applied CLASS for the evaluation of another program in Chile, Un buen Comienzo (Yoshikawa, et al. 2013) . 13 The coders had to take a two-day training course provided by a Teachstone certified trainer, who also had the experience of applying CLASS to the Chilean context. After the course, coders took a four-hour online test (developed by Teachstone), that asks the candidate to watch and code five segments of model videos. The candidate is approved when achieving a reliability rate of at least 80% in all videos and at least in two of the videos the same reliability in all CLASS dimensions. Only the candidates that passed the test were certified to be CLASS coders in this evaluation. In addition, before starting the coding of the videos for the PAC evaluation, coders participated in another training course to adapt their knowledge of CLASS t o the Chilean context. The training included watching and coding videos of Chilean teachers, which were previously coded by experienced CLASS coders.
The final CLASS scores for each domain consisted on the average across dimensions within the corresponding domain.
For the coding, videos were randomly assigned to the 10 certified coders. The coding process lasted for five weeks.
During the first week of coding, 100% of the videos were double coded. The double-coding was expected to be gradually reduced in the following weeks if reliability rates remained above 80%. 14 Overall, 52% of the videos were double coded, with an average reliability rate of 84.2%. 15 This inter-coder reliability is comparable to that found in other studies. For example, as cited in Araujo et al. (2014) , Brown et al. (2010) report an inter-coder reliability rate of 83% for the 12% of the classroom observations which were double-coded. Araujo et al. (2014) get a higher inter-coder reliability rate (93%) double-coding 100% of the videos.
Teachers' CLASS scores and 2012 SIMCE scores
In accordance to the empirical literature analyzing the association between CLASS scores and students' test scores, in this subsection we report the correlation between CLASS and SIMCE scores for the 2012 cohort, at the student level.
Formally, we aim at estimating γ in the following equation:
where SIMCE kigcj is the SIMCE score in subject k = {Math, Language, Science}, of student i, in demographic group g, in classroom c, at school j; CLASSpc cj is the first principal component of the scores in the 11 CLASS dimensions for the teacher in classroom c; X igj is a vector of student-school characteristics that includes baseline characteristics; and ϵ igcj is a vector of unobservable student-classroom characteristics assumed to be uncorrelated with variable CLASSpc. Since in this design teachers have not been randomly assigned to students, γ cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of within classroom interactions on tests scores, but only as a correlation. Table 4 shows the result of the estimation of γ by OLS. The table has the same structure as tables presented in section 4
(except that we do not have compliance regressions to show for this exercise). The most striking result from the table is that low income students, who did not benefit from the PAC program, benefit a great deal from better teacher-students interactions. In effect, one additional principal component score unit in CLASS scores increases test scores for low income students in between 7% and 9% SIMCE scores standard deviations. These results are robust to adjustments in p-values to control for the FWE rate. For high income students, effects are smaller and in most subjects insignificant.
Given the importance of teachers' CLASS scores in the performance of disadvantaged kids, we next explore whether the program was successful in improving teachers' performance in CLASS.
The impact of PAC on CLASS
We analyze whether participating in the program increases the performance of within classroom interactions.
Since the outcome variable in this exercise (the CLASS score) was measured for 185 classrooms, the analysis in this subsection is at the classroom level. Formally, we aim at estimating the following model:
where CLASSpc cj is the CLASS dimensions principal component for classroom c in school j; PAC j is the treatment indicator variable that takes value one if school j was randomized into PAC and zero otherwise; X cj is a vector of teacher-classroom characteristics that includes an indicator of the income group the classroom belongs to, the type of administration of the school, average SIMCE scores of the school for the period 2005-2009, general experience of the teacher and the school principal, and tenure of the teacher and the principal in the school; and ϵ cj is a vector of unobservable teacher-classroom characteristics assumed to be uncorrelated with PAC. Table 5 shows the result of the estimation. Columns (1) and (3) The results consistently suggest that the program has a negative effect on teacher-classroom interactions in 2012 but that these effects cannot be distinguished from zero at the standard significance levels. The lack of effect of the program on classroom performance might be the reason behind the lack of effects on SIMCE scores at the student level, for disadvantaged students.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper estimates de impact of Plan Apoyo Compartido (PAC), a program launched in 2011 to improve learning outcomes of students in the poorest performing schools in Chile, according to the national standardized test (SIMCE). Through standardized teaching and class preparation material, and through the support of internal and external pedagogic teams, the program aimed at reducing the gap in terms of SIMCE between the poorest population and the national average. The evaluation profited from the randomized selection implemented by the program coordinators in the first year. Since the program could cover only half of the eligible schools when it was launched, a random selection was held to invite schools to participate.
Results show a mild impact in the SIMCE in the end of the 2011 school year (a few months after PAC was launched) and concentrated only in higher income boys. In 2012, these effects disappear and only a small impact on higher income girls is detected. In 2013 (not showed in the paper), all effects disappear.
In order to understand what lies behind these disappointing results, we analyze if the program changed teachers'
practices and teacher-students interactions. For that purpose we use CLASS, a well-documented instrument in the education literature that scores, through a rigorous protocol, different dimensions of teacher-students interaction.
CLASS scores are correlated with SIMCE results, although we cannot identify causality in this relationship with this data. However, we find no impact of PAC in teachers' CLASS scores, what is consistent with the mild and short-term results of the program on students learning.
These findings have relevant policy implications for PAC and for similar programs. To achieve long lasting significant impact on students learning, affecting teachers' practices and improving their interactions with students is key. Notes: Pre attrition sample refers to the universe of students in the fourth grade. Post attrition sample refers to the sub sample of students that took each of the subject SIMCE tests. The statistic (Stat.) reported in the balancing exercises is E(PAC=1) -E(PAC=0), that is, the difference in means between the treatment and the control groups. The statistic (Stat.) reported in the test of joint significance exercises is the F-test. Baseline characteristics include student demographics and Mother's and father's education. Student demographics are Female (a dummy variable that takes value one if the student is a female and zero otherwise), Low income (a dummy variable that takes value one if the student's family monthly income is less than 300,000 Chilean pesos, the minimum wage in such country), Nuclear, Extended, and Other family (three dummies that indicate the family structure of the student), and Nbr years failed (a count variable that captures the number of primary school years the student had to retake previous to the fourth grade). Mother's and father's education refer to the highest education level reached by the student's mother and father. 
